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rn THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST.~TE OF CTAH 
* * * 
In re ) 
) 
) 
DO~ 0. BLACKHAM ) 
) 
) Case No. 15610 
Dis cip Unary ) 
Proceeding ) 
* * 
J, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant herein, Don 0. Blackham, appeals to the Utah 
Supreme Court from the findings of a hearing officer in the disciplinary 
oroceeding before the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, 
and from the recommendation of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar that the appellant be suspended from the practice of law for a 
0 eriod of two years, and that his reinstatement after such period be 
'Jn> ;ipon satisfying the Board of Commissioners that he is then competent 
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Blackham (ms) 
to practice law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In late September, or early October 1974, Ms. Floyd Hunti:; 
contacted the appellant, Don O. Blackham, a practicing attorney with lu: 
offices in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, at his office, by telephone, 
inquiring about some rental property owned by Ms. Hunting and her 
husband, and located in Kearns, Utah. Appellant was advised that the 
real property of the Huntings had been condemned by the Utah State 
Health Department (R-115), and asked what could be done. Appellant 
advised her (R-116). At a later date, Ms. Hunting made a personal 
contact with appellant, after she had left a copy of summons and complt 
with appellant's secretary (R-117). After this personal conference, 
appellant filed on behalf of Mr. and Ms. Hunting, who were named deferc, 
in a legal action concerning real property owned by the Huntings, firsz' 
notice to dismiss (Exhibit 4), and appellant appeared at a hearing on sue 
motion. Thereafter, appellant filed an answer and counterclaim on 
behalf of Mr. and Ms. Hunting (Exhibit 11). 
During the period when pleadings were being filed and hear'.:~ 
held, Mr. and Ms. Hunting were residing in Vernal, Utah, and contact 
between the appellant and Mr. and Ms. Hunting was primarily by telepr 
2 cf 
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(R-120). In his conversations with Ms. Hunting, and also in conversa-
tion with Ms. Hunting's daughter, Ms. Hales, no one expressed to the 
appellant any concern over the mental or physical capabilities of 
Ms. Hunting (R-121). 
On November 10, 1974, interrogatories were served upon 
appellant in connection with the pending lawsuit (Exhibit 13), and on 
~ovember 12, 1974, appellant forwarded a copy of the interrogatories 
to Mr. and Ms. Hunting, requesting that the requested information be 
furnished prior to December 10, 1974 (Exhibit 37). Appellant received 
no communication from Mr. and Ms. Hunting; however, three separate 
appointments were made for the Huntings through appellant's office, 
none of which were kept by the Huntings (R-122-123). 
On December 18, 1974, a motion to compel answers to 
interrogatories was filed (Exhibit 14), and appellant attempted to telephone 
the Huntings on several occasions with regard thereto, all without 
success {R-12 3). 
A hearing on the motion to compel was held on December 31, 
1974, at which time the court gave ten days to answer the interrogatories, 
and ordered that the default of the Huntings be entered, and their counter-
claim stricken, if the interrogatories were not answered (Exhibit 16). 
3 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Blackham (ms) 
Appellant again attempted to contact the Huntings, and mailed a copy 
the order to them (R-12 4). 
On about January 7, 1975, appellant received a telephone 
call from Ms. Hales, the daughter of the Huntings, indicating that 
Mr. and Ms. Huntings had been committed to the Utah State Hospital 
because of alcoholism (R-125). Appellant telephoned to the office of 
opposing counsel, Mr. Brian M. Barnard, and left a message relating 
the facts he had received, and requested that Mr. Barnard contact hi.IT:. 
On January 14, 1975, Mr. Barnard presented an order to the court 
which order dismissed the counterclaim of the Huntings and entered 
their default (Exhibit 1 7). Appellant did not file a motion for relief 
from the order of January 14, 1975, because he felt he should have so:.' 
answers to the interrogatories in the file before requesting any relie;· 
(R-127). 
Appellant requested Ms. Hales to furnish him with the naf.'' 
of the doctor treating the Huntings, in order for him to prepare pleadi".:: 
that he felt would be satisfactory to the court in connection with this 
matter, but the requested information was never furnished to him 
(R-128). 
At a later date, in April or May 1975, lVlr. and Ms. H11nc, 
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,2-lme to appellant's office and discussed the pending matter with him, at 
11 hich time information was given to appellant for the answers to inter-
rogatories that were still outstanding. Additional information was 
required, and Mr. and Ms. Hunting advised appellant that they would 
obtain the information and return to his office that same afternoon, so 
that answers to the interrogatories could be prepared, submitted to the 
court, and other appropriate action taken. The Huntings failed to return 
to appellant's office, and appellant had no further communication with 
Mr. and Ms. Hunting after that date (R-130). 
Appellant's inability to communicate with the Huntings was 
frustrating, and resulted in no further communication being made or 
attempted (R-131). 
In June 1976, an execution on the judgment entered against 
the Huntings was issued, and a sheriff's sale held, and the property sold 
and subsequently assigned to Brian M. Barnard, attorney for the plaintiff 
against the Huntings in the initial action. 
In February 1976, Brian M. Barnard filed an action to quiet 
~itle to the property against Mr. and Ms. Hunting and Mr. and Ms. Hales, 
the son-in-law and daughter of the Huntings, who had received a deed 
thm the Huntings and, in addition, held an assignment of a judgment 
>gai'1st t!ie H'-lntings and in favor of Interlake Thrift. The Hales received 
5 
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Blackham (ms) 
this assignment of judgment, having paid Interlake Thrift considerati,;~ 
for the assignment, which assignment was part of the court file 
Ms. Hales contacted appellant, who filed on behalf of Mr. 
and Ms. Hales an answer in the quiet title proceeding commenced by 
Mr. Barnard (Exhibits 22 and 25). Various pleadings were filed in this 
action, including interrogatories, which set forth the claim of Mr. and 
Ms. Hales. The matter was subsequently tried before the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., on November 10, 1976. 
Prior to the trial date, the matter had been discussed by 
telephone (R-137) between appellant and Ms. Hales. At the time oftria: 
Ms. Hales was called as a witness in support of the position of Mr. and 
Ms. Hales that they held not only a titled interest, but an interest by 
reason of the assignment of the Interlake Thrift judgment. After the 
matter was tried and argued to the court, the court took the case \.mder 
advisement and entered a memorandum decision adverse to the interes: 
of Mr. and lVIs. Hales (Exhibit 30). Findings of Fact, Conclusions oi 
Law and Decree were thereafter entered by the court. 
At about the time the decree had been entered by the cour'. 
appellant received a telephone call from Arden W. Lauritzen, an attor~' 
of Logan, Utah, who called on behalf of :Vlr. and Ms. Hales concern.ins 
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l~ JChJl3lll (ms) 
the trial and its results (R-141). Appellant thereafter talked by telephone 
w Mr. Hales and advised him of his rights of appeal in connection with 
the adverse decision by Judge Hanson. No further communications were 
had with the Hales or the Huntings, until this matter was brought before 
the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, 
The hearing officer found that appellant had failed to take 
sufficient appropriate action to protect the rights of Mr. and Ms. Hunting, 
and failed to introduce evidence on behalf of Mr. and Ms. Hales, and 
that by reason of his conduct, he violated Rule N, Canon VI, BR 6-lOl(A) 
(1)(2) and (3), and Canon VII, BR 7-lOl(A)(l) and (2). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF RULE N, CANON VI, 
BR 6-10l(A)(l)(2) and (3) OF THE REVISED RULES 
AND CONDUCT OF THE UTAH STATE BAR. 
Rule BR6-101 provides as follows: 
"BR 6-101 - Failing to Act Competently. 
(A) A lawyer shall not: 
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows, or should 
know, that he is not competent to handle without 
associating with him a lawyer who is competent to 
handle it. 
(2) Handle a legal matter ~ithout preparation adequate 
in the circumstances. 
(3) :>reglect a legal matter entrusted to him." 
7 
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Blackham (ms) 
From the testimony presented before the hearing officer in 
this matter, it is quite apparent that the appellant was competent, and 
able to represent both the Huntings and the Hales in connection with 
their problems. A review of the exhibits would show that the appellant 
was aware of the questions involved and the legal matters presented to 
him, and that he adequately represented the Huntings and the Hales 
insofar as he could do so without their full cooperation and assistance. 
Appellant attempted to obtain sufficient information to 
permit him to continue his representation of the Huntings in the initial 
action, even after being advised by Ms. Hales of the commitment of the 
Huntings to the Utah State Mental Hospital. As indicated by the appellar.: 
it was extremely frustrating for him not to be able to communicate with 
the persons he was representing, and not to be able to obtain informatic: 
that would assist him in their representation. It was apparent that the 
competence of the appellant to handle the matter for Mr. and Ms. Hunti:.; 
was not the question at issue. The apparent question was how far shoc:c 
the appellant have gone in pursuing the Huntings in an attempt to obtain 
their cooperation in his representation of them. It is evident that 
appellant was not lacking competence, and that the finding of the heari~.f 
officer in this matter, that there was a violation of Canon VI, is just 
8 
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not Justified by the evidence presented. 
POINT II 
THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE APPELLANT DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF RULE VI, CANON VII, 
BR 7-lOl(A)(l) AND 2) OF THE REVISED RULES OF 
CONDUCT OF THE UTAH STATE BAR. 
Rule BR 7-101 provides as follows: 
"BR 7-101 provides as follows: 
(A) A Lawyer Shall not Intentionally: 
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objections of his client 
through reasonable available means permitted by 
law and the disciplinary rules ..• 
(2) Fail to carry out a contract of employment 
entered into with a client for professional services 
II 
Canon VII of the Revised Rules of Conduct of the Utah State 
Bar places upon the client the burden of making decisions which may 
substantially prejudice the client's own rights. The present case appears 
to be a classic situation, wherein the clients, Mr. and Ms. Hunting, 
made a determination that affected their own rights, notwithstanding the 
attempts of the appellant to prosecute and protect their interests. This 
is particularly borne out by the incident wherein after judgment had been 
entered, and within a period of time wherein relief could have been 
requested, Mr. and Ms. Hunting, after being apprised of the need to 
:''.i.rnish complete information to answer the interrogatories propounded, 
9 
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Blackham (ms) 
left appellant's office, committing themselves to return the same day 
so that the matter could be concluded, and thereafter failed i:o return 
or submit any further information to the appellant. It is true that a 
lawyer should represent his client with zeal, but the client has a 
responsibility to zealously assist his lawyer in the defense oi his ac:io~. 
or the protection of his rights, and a lawyer cannot perform these acts 
for his clien~ thus, the frustration expressed by the appellant herein 
in his inability to communicate with Mr. and Ms. Hunting, even after 
they had returned to his office and expressed a desire to furnish 
information. Appellant attempted to represent with zeal the interests 
and position of Mr. and Ms. Hunting, but without assistance he was 
unable to make decisions, furnish information, and indeed proceed on 
their behalf. He was on a road that he could not travel alone. 
In connection with the representation of appellant in the 
matter for Mr. and Ms. Hales, the evidence indicates that at the time 
of the trial of the quiet title action, that Ms. Hales testified as to the 
position that the Hales held concerning the real property, and that the 
files and records of the court at that time held the assigrunent of JUdgn'.e·. 
in favor of the Hales, and that these pleadings were all before the co•1r: 
at the time of the court's decision. The fact that the court ruled ad·;ero· 
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to ;\Ir. and iVIs. Hales cannot be interpreted as a determination that the 
appellant had not represented them zealously and reasonably. 
POINT ill 
THE RECOMMENDATION THAT APPELLAl'IT BE 
SUSPENDED FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS IS 
UNNECESSARILY SEVERE, AND A MORE MODEST 
ALTERNATNE WOULD BETTER SUIT THE 
PUBLIC, THE PROFESSION AND THE APPELLANT. 
The Committee of the Board of Bar Commissioners of the 
Gtah State Bar recommended that Mr. Blackham, the appellant, be 
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years. It is 
submitted that this recommendation, in light of the record, is unneces -
sarily harsh. It is not a question of whether or not Mr. Blackham 
represented the Huntings and the Hales in accordance with the require-
ments of the Canon of Ethics, but apparently a determination of the 
degree of representation. 
It is recognized that this court will accord substantial weight 
to the recommendations of the Utah State Bar Commission concerning 
the disciplinary action to be imposed. In re King, 7 U. 2d 258; 322 P. 2d 
1085. On the other hand, the court is not a rubber stamp for the 
recommendation of the Bar Commission. In re McFarland, 10 U. 2d 217; 
250 P. 2d 631; In re Badger, 28 U. 2d 240; 501 P. 2d 1006. It is 
1 1 
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Blackham (ms) 
submitted that the evidence presented to the hearing officer JUStiiies a 
less severe response. It may be said that the purpose of discip;ining 
lawyers is the protection of the public, the profession, and the admin.:s-
tration of justice, and not the punishment of the person disciplined. Ir. 
re Richey, 76 Ariz. 152, 261 P. 2d 673; in re Badger, 27 lJ. 2d 17-t 
493 P. 2d 1273. It is submitted that in the instant case, a two year 
suspension is far more than necessary to protect the public, the 
profession and the administration of justice, and at the same time wor'' 
a substantial hardship on the appellant, when other alternatives wo;ild -, 
more suitable. The evidence presented before the hearing officer 
showed basically nothing that would challenge Mr. Blackham 's honesry 
integrity or competence, and in fact showed nothing more than a 
determination to abide by the apparent decisions of his client. This 
was not a case where was a breach of professional conduct or mismar.-
agement of client funds, or any other act that might ilnpugn the honesc: 
or integrity of Mr. Blackham. 
In re King, Supra, this court felt that suspension for six 
months was sufficient where the attorney was a party to the knowing ;oE 
of perjured testimony, a much more severe breach of pro!essiona: c:cc 
than that involved in the current case. s=ertainly, as was determined 
? 
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t!1ere, the punishment should not exceed that which is necessary for the 
protection of the public and the profession in any given situation. 
The California Supreme Court, in the petition of Gaffney, 
171 P, 2d 873, considering the petition for reinstatement, observed: 
"The law is interested in the regeneration of erring 
attorneys, and in the enforcement of a sound dis -
cipline, its dispositions ought not to place unnecessary 
burdens upon them. " 
It is submitted that if this court agrees with the California 
court's expression, that it must conclude that the punishment imposed 
here is an unnecessary burden, and that there is a more suitable 
alternative that will adequately protect the profession, the public, 
and in fact assist more in the regeneration, if any be necessary, of 
:Vlr. Blackham, than that recommended by the Bar Commission. It is 
submitted that the more suitable alternative in this matter, and one that 
is highly effective, is that of public reproval. Public reproval may have 
a better effect in many cases than suspension from the practice of law. 
The attorney is appropriately disciplined, the public put on notice of the 
pr':'blem, and the attorney knows that his fellow practitioners will be 
'.vatching his conduct, and that he must walk a very straight line. In 
\·3.ughn v The State Bar, 100 Cal. Rep. 713, where there was a 
13 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Blackha.rn (ms) 
comingli..'1g, without misappropriation, the court found public repr ,, a. 
sufficient. In a case similar to In re King, Supra, although not as 
severe, the case of Masesia.n v. The State Bar, 103 Cal. Rep. 915. 
..... 
a reprimand was felt sufficient. In Hulland v. The State Bar 503 P. 2: 
608, the wilful failure to render legal services, and the wrongful use 
a client's confession of Judgment, was felt to be adequately met by a 
public reprimand. 
California has also adopted the practice of censuring an 
attorney by suspending an attorney, but then not carrying out the actu:O.: 
suspension for such period as is deemed reasonable, and placing the 
attorney on probation. Fielding v. The State Bar, 509 P. 2d 193, 
Persion v. State Bar, 50 9 P. 2d 52 4. This places the attorney in a 
controlled setting where he knows that his probation can be revoked, ar.c 
the suspension ordered active and effective for any other violation. I: 
does not take the attorney's livelihood away from i1i.rn, but acts as a~ 
incentive for him to meet the highest standards of ethics in the fut·.:re 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the evidence does not support the c'faC.: 
of the Commission, and that the recommendation that :'.\Ir. B~acizhar:: :< 
suspended for two yea.rs from the practice of law cannot be :us:L·:ed · 
the evidence presented. If, however, the court belie':e:: thJ: '.!:-
,,.. 
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snollid ha-,-e been more zealous in his representation, should have done 
ciure to require that his clients participate in the matters before the 
court, and that by reason of his failure to act, some disciplinary action 
is justified, then it is submitted that in view of the facts, and in view of 
r.he circumstances, that public reproval will have the greatest effect, 
and will accomplish more realistically the desired result; that is, the 
protection of the public, the profession, and the administration of 
JUStice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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